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INTRODUCTION
Although the paradigmatic refugee is a male individual who has
sought asylum because he has been persecuted by an oppressive
government for his political beliefs, the majority of refugees in the
world today are women and children fleeing from civil conflicts in
which the distinction between oppressor and oppressed is often
unclear) At the same time, developed States are increasingly
. Lecturer in Law, University of Nottingham. This article originates
from a paper
presented for a course on "The Exclusion Clause: Article IF of the Refugee
Convention and its Relationship to International Law" at the T.M.C. Asser
Instituut, The Hague, in June 2001. 1 am grateful to the Asser Instituut, in
particular to Avril McDonald, for the invitation to lecture on the subject. I am also
grateful to Robert Cryer and Paul Eden for their help with this article. The usual
disclaimer applies.
1. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, REFUGEES BY
NUMBERS 8 (2000) (stating that as of 1999, the countries of origin for the ten
largest groups of refugees in the world were Afghanistan, Iraq, Burundi, Sierra
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complaining that the current international legal regime governing the
status of refugees places undue burdens upon them.2 In these
circumstances, there has been a tendency in recent years to subject
asylum seekers to closer scrutiny to determine whether, by reason of
their previous conduct, they are undeserving of refugee status.
There is no right to asylum under customary international law."
The granting or withholding of asylum is regulated by a number of
multilateral treaties; the most significant being the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees ("Refugee Convention").5 This
Convention provides that Contracting States shall grant refugee
status to persons who are outside their country of origin and cannot
return due to a well-founded fear of persecution because of their
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group,
or political opinion.6 Such persons shall not be expelled or returned
Leone, Sudan, Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Angola, Eritrea, and Croatia, which
are all nations that have recently faced internal civil conflicts).
2. See id. at 6 (explaining that the majority of persons of concern to the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ("U.N.H.C.R.")refugees, asylum seekers, returned refugees, and internally displaced persons-are
located in developing, not developed States).
3. See Dennis McNamara, Exclusion Clauses: Closer Attention Paid to the
Exclusion Clauses, in REFUGEE AND ASYLUM LAW: AssESSING THE SCOPE FOR
JUDICIAL PROTECTION 68 (International Association of Refugee Judges ed., 1997)
("For a number of reasons the international community is taking a longer, harder
look at who should be protected and assisted as refugees than at any time in the
past. Partly, this no doubt reflects the hardening climate towards refugees
generally: there is an increased eagerness to weed out the undeserving."). At the
time, Mr. McNamara was Director, Division of International Protection,
U.N.H.C.R. See id.
4. See

COLIN

HARVEY,

SEEKING ASYLUM

IN THE

UK:

PROBLErils

AND

48-49 (2000) (discussing the resistance in the international community
to recognize asylum as a legal right).
PROSPECTS

5. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 195 1,189
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention] (describing the general duties and
obligations of refugees and their host countries and reflecting the scope of the
treaty); see also Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, January 31, 1967, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 (amending the Refugee Convention to include persons becoming
refugees after January 1, 195 1).
6. See Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. I A(2) (providing that such fears
must be based on events occurring before January 1,1951); see also GUY S.
GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

18-20 (2d ed. 1996)

(discussing the persons who qualify as refugees under the Refugee Convention and
the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees).
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to the frontiers of territories where their life or freedom is threatened

for one of the specified reasons.7 However, not all persons who may
be subject to persecution can benefit from refugee status.' The
Refugee Convention provides that certain classes of persons are
ineligible for refugee status, either because they are not in need of
international protection or are receiving it elsewhere,' or because
they are, by reason of their conduct, undeserving cases.'0
Article IF of the Refugee Convention deals with persons
undeserving of the benefits of refugee status." Article IF provides,
inter alia, that the Refugee Convention "shall not apply to any
person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for
considering that: (a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war
crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international
2
instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes."-'
In recent years there has been an increasing tendency for warring
factions to recruit children into their armed forces and groups. ' Such

7. See Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 33(1)
prohibition on expulsion).

(setting forth a

8. See id. art. 33(2) (indicating that refugees posing a threat to the security of
their host country may not take advantage of this provision).
9. See id. arts. 1C-E (providing examples of persons who are not eligible for
refugee status, including individuals who are eligible for the protection of their
home states).
10. See id. art. 1F (explaining that the Refugee Convention does not apply to
persons who are suspected of committing certain crimes, such as crimes against
peace).

11. See id. art. 1F(c) (providing that a person is not protected by the Refugee
Convention if "he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of
the United Nations").
12. Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. I F(c); see also Statute of the Office
of the United Nations High Commissionerfor Refugees, G.A. Res. 428(v), U.N.

GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 121 (1950) (stating that the High Commissioner
shall not offer protection to those who have committed crimes under certain
treaties); Convention on the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept.
10, 1969, art. 1(5), 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, 46 (declaring that the "activities of such
subversive elements should be discouraged").
13. See The Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 166, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/44149 (1989)
[hereinafter C.R.C.] (establishing that "[flor the purposes of the present
Convention a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years
unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier"). Thus,
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child soldiers have committed atrocities in a number of recent or
current armed conflicts.14 This article considers the implications of
Article IF with respect to child soldiers who may have committed

war crimes or crimes against humanity. "5

I. ARTICLE IF OF THE REFUGEE CONVENTION
Article IF is framed in mandatory language: the provisions of the

Refugee Convention "shall not apply to any person" falling within its
terms.16 From a literal reading of the provision, it would appear that

States have no discretion as to whether or not to grant refugee status
to persons suspected of committing war crimes, crimes against

peace, or crimes against humanity. 7 Rather, they are prohibited from
granting refugee status in such circumstances. 8 This interpretation is
confirmed by consideration of the provision's drafting history.' Prior

to the scrutiny of the Economic and Social Council and the General
Assembly of the United Nations and adoption by a Conference of
Plenipotentiaries, the first draft of the Refugee Convention was
prepared by an ad hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related

based on the Convention's definition of "child," there has been an increase in the
recruitment of children into the armed forces and groups by warring factions. See
id. Unless specifically stated, the terms "child" and "children" shall have the same
meaning in this article as they do in the Convention.
14. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, EASY PREY: CHILD SOLDIERS IN LIBERIA 23,
32 (Human Rights Watch/Africa Human Rights Watch Children's Rights Project)
(1994) (discussing the promotion of child soldiers for decapitating an enemy).
15. Crimes against the peace will not be discussed. For obvious reasons, child
soldiers do not hold sufficiently elevated rank to participate in decisions to wage
aggressive war.
16. See Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. IF (outlining three reasons to
determine to whom the convention does not apply).
17. See id. (proving that the Refugee Convention will not apply to individuals
about whom states have "serious reasons for considering" them guilty of certain
actions).
18. See id. (providing that the Refugee Convention shall not apply to anyone
who may have committed a war crime, serious non-political crime outside the
nation of refuge prior to entry as refugee, and has been guilty of acts that run
contrary to the goals of the United Nations).
19. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 6, at 95-97 (explaining that the drafling
history of the Refugee Convention demonstrates that the prohibition on accepting
criminals was considered from the beginning of the creation of the Convention).
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Problems. 20 During the initial session of the Committee, the reaction
to a United States' proposal that each receiving State retain
discretion on whether to exclude war criminals from refugee status
resulted in the adoption of a French amendment confirming an
obligation to not apply the Convention to war criminals. 2' The
relevant provision (which became Article IF) subsequently was
amended, but not so as in any way to detract from its obligatory
quality.2
It further appears that in applying to "any person", Article IF does
not distinguish between children and adults, so that the obligation to
not grant refugee status to persons who may have committed such
crimes applies with respect to both adult and child perpetrators. " In
some quarters this has been seen as unsatisfactory. Child soldiers,
even if they have committed atrocities, can be seen as victims rather
than violators. 24 It has been argued that children should never be
subject to exclusion from refugee status on the basis of Article 1F.Y
However, although there are many arguments in favor of such a

20. See id. at 95 (indicating that the exclusion of war criminals was first
considered by the ad hoe committee during January-February 1950).
21. See id. at 96 (explaining that the French amendment resulted in revision to
the definition of "refugee").
22. See id. at 97 (revealing that the subject was referred to a working group,
which recommended the current wording of Article IF(a)).
23. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The Erclusion
Clauses: Guidelines on their Application, December 1995, reprinted in, REFUGEE
LAW IN CONTEXT: THE EXCLUSION CLAUSE 19, 22 (Peter J. van Krieken, ed.,
1999) [hereinafter Exclusion Clause Guidelines] (explaining the view of the
U.N.H.C.R. regarding the exclusion clauses of various refugee documents); see
also United Nations High Conunissioner for Refugees on Child-Soldiers, reprinted
in REFUGEE LAW IN CONTEXT: THE EXCLUSION CLAUSE 43, 44 (Peter J. van

Krieken, ed., 1999) [hereinafter U.N.H.C.R. on Child Soldiers] (stating that "[t]he
exclusion clauses do not distinguish between adults and minors").
24. See U.N.C.H.R. on Child Soldiers, supra note 23, at 43 (asserting that the
"vulnerable status and special needs of children should always be taken into
consideration").
25. See Michael Kingsley Niynah, Erclusions Under Article IF: Some
Reflections on Context, Principles and Practice, 12 INT'L. J. REFUGEE L. 295, at
308 n.20 (2000) (discussing this argument as it is made in the "Non-Governmental
Organizations' Submission to the Standing Committee of the United Nations High
Commissioner's Programme," which was presented at the 10th meeting of the
Executive Committee of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees' Programme).
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view, it is contrary to both the wording and the drafting history of
Article IF.26 Given the international law rules on the interpretation of
treaties, any such reading of Article IF would be implausible.2 7 In
practice children have been excluded from refugee status as a result
of the application of Article 1F.28

II. CHILD SOLDIERS IN THE WORLD TODAY
The most likely reason why Article IF does not distinguish
between children and adults is that its drafters failed to consider that
the article might be applied to children.2 9 The Refugee Convention
was agreed with the Second World War fresh in the drafters'
minds.30 The participation of children in armed conflicts was not a
problem, or, at least, was not seen as one. The Second World War
had been largely fought with mass conscript armies. Only in
extremis, such as in Germany in 1945, had any of the major powers
conscripted children into their armed forces. Where children had
participated in hostilities it was as irregulars-partisans or resisters.
Such participation was seen as voluntary and heroic or, at best, as an
unfortunate necessity. Certainly, child combatants were not
associated with the commission of war crimes. Today, however, the
situation is very different. A recent survey estimated that, worldwide, there could be around 300,000 children under eighteen serving

26. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 6, at 257-56 (stating that neither the 195 1
Convention nor the Convention on the Rights of the Child, so far as they address
the issue of children as refugees, provide an adequate legal basis).
27. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31-32,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331
28. See Exclusion Clause Guidelines, supra note 23, at 22 ("Children under
eighteen can and have been excluded in special cases."); see also Sibylle
Kaepferer, Exchsion Clauses in Europe-A Comparative Overview of State
Practice in France,Belgium and the United Kingdom, 12 INT'L J. REFUGPF. L. 194,

214 (2000) (providing examples of Belgian and French cases where children under
eighteen were excluded).
29. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 6, at 97 (explaining that the drafters only
considered "those with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering
that they have committed a crime").
30. See id. at 95 (informing that the drafting of the Refugee Convention started
in 1946).
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in governmental or insurgent armed forces or groups. -" Children were
reported as participating in some thirty-six armed conflicts from
1997 to 1998, and children under the age of fifteen participated in
twenty-eight armed conflicts. 3 2 Further, children seem to be used
increasingly in combatant as well as auxiliary roles."
A child's recruitment into an armed group can be both physically
and psychologically damaging.34 Child soldiers are frequently put at
risk from enemy attack.' Even if they escape injury, participation in
combat subjects children to psychological pressures with which they
do not have the maturity to deal.' 6 Even if they avoid combat, child
soldiers may be subjected to other damaging treatment; for example,
they may be forced to carry over-heavy loads or be unable to contact
their families.' 7 Consequently, all recruitment of children under
fifteen is prohibited by international law?.8 Indeed, the prohibition is

31. See RACHEL BRETr & MARGARET MCCALLIN, CUILDREN: TIlE INVISIBLE
SOLDIERS 19 (2d ed. 1998) (stating that over 300,000 children are participating in

combat but that it is impossible to provide an exact figure).
32. See id. at 19-22 (discussing generally the international participation of
children in combat).
33. See id. at 20 (noting that boy childhood soldiers historically have been used
as servants on the battlefield).
34. See Human Rights Watch, Children's Rights: Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2
[hereinafter Stop the Use of Child Soldiers) (arguing for the end of the use of child
soldiers for, among other reasons, the devastating physical and psychological toll
combat takes on children), at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/crplindex.htm (last
visited June 30, 2002).
35. See id. (discussing the level of involvement of children in various armed
conflicts).
36. See id. (indicating the physical and psychological vulnerabilities of children
that make them obedient soldiers and swifter casualties).
37. See id. (noting the tasks many child soldiers are required to do as the forced
isolation from their families).
38. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8,
1977, art. 77(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 39 [hereinafter Protocol I) (directing that parties
to the conflict shall take all feasible measures to ensure that children under the age
of fifteen do not directly participate in the hostilities and the parties should not
recruit them); see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 4(3)(c), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol I1];
C.R.C., supra note 13, art. 38(2)-(3) (prohibiting children under fifteen from
participating in hostilities); see also Matthew Happold, Child Soldiers in
International Law: The Legal Regulation of Children "sParticipation in Hostilities
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viewed sufficiently seriously for its breach to be a war crime-a
violation of the laws and customs of war engaging individual
criminal responsibility. 9
However, many child soldiers do not serve willingly; they have
been abducted or forcibly recruited. 40 The compulsory recruitment of
all children (that is, all persons under eighteen years of age) is
prohibited under a number of treaties and possibly under customary
international law.4" Further, in many cases child soldiers are the
victims of additional human rights violations at the hands of their
own comrades.42 Child soldiers often are beaten or even killed by
their commanders. 43 Girl child soldiers are raped and subjected to
47 NETH. INT'L L. R. 27, at 43-48 (2000) (suggesting that there is probably a rule
of customary international law prohibiting the recruitment of children under fifteen
into States' armed forces and obligating States to make all feasible efforts to
prevent such children from taking a direct part in hostilities).
39. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi)(e)(vii), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9* (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute] (declaring
that conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen into the armed forces
or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities qualifies as a war
crime); Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 4(c), U.N. Doc.
S/2000/915 (2002) (noting that the Statute of International Criminal Court
recognizes that the abduction and forced recruitment of children under the age of
fifteen into armed forces or groups for the purpose of using them to actively
participate in hostilities constitutes a war crime); see also Letter from Sergey
Lavrov, President of the Security Council, to the Secretary General (Dec. 22, 2000)
U.N. Doc S/2000/1234 (2000); Ninth Report of the Secretary General on the
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, para. 54, U.N. Doc. S12001/1228 (2001)
(implying that the recruitment of children under fifteen into armed forces or groups
is a war crime under customary international law).
40. See Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, supra note 34, at 1-2 (describing how
children are forced into fighting).
41. See African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, art. 22, O.A.U.
(1990),
available
at
Doe.
CAB/LEG/24.9/49
http://www.l.umn.eduhumanrts/Africa/afchild (last visited June 23, 2002):
Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination
of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (I.L.O. Convention 182), June 17, 1999, 38
I.L.M. 1207, art. 2-3(a)[hereinafter ILO Child Labour Convention]; Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of
Children in Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 54/263, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, art.2
(2000) (prohibiting all recruitment of children).
42. See BRETT & MCCALLIN, supra note 31, at 88-90 (providing examples of
"inhuman and degrading treatment" of child soldiers).
43. See, e.g., Amnesty International, Sierra Leone: Childhood - A Casualty of
Conflict, 8 (2000) [hereinafter Amnesty International] (describing the treatment,
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other forms of sexual violence.' Child soldiers are plied with alcohol
and drugs, and are coerced or manipulated into committing
atrocities. 45 It is submitted that such treatment can amount to

persecution within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the Refugee
Convention, and that children recruited into armed forces or groups
can compose a "particular social group" within the scope of the
provision. 46

III. CHILD SOLDIERS AS REFUGEES
The concept of persecution under the Refugee Convention is a
flexible one, with no universally accepted definition. 7 Nevertheless,
there appears to be general agreement that violating an individual's
fundamental (or core) human rights amounts to persecution." As
mentioned previously, recruiting children under the age of fifteen is a
sufficiently serious breach of international law so as to give rise to
individual criminal responsibility.4 9 Further, the forced or
compulsory use of all children under the age of eighteen in armed
conflict has been categorized as a form of slavery or, at least, a
practice similar to slavery.50 There is no doubt that the enslavement
especially by their commanders, of child soldiers in Sierra Leone), at
http:lweb.amnesty.org/802568F7005C4453/0/516C89BFE 1E7CA4B8025694500
723A8C?Open (last visited Aug. 13, 2002).
44. See id. at 12 (discussing the fact that girl soldiers in Sierra Leone are
forced to become wives or concubines of adult male soldiers).
45. See id. (describing the means by which children are forced to fight in Sierra
Leone).
46. See Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. I(A)(2) (detennining refugee
status based on the persecution experienced by that person).
47. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON
PROCEDURE AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951
CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES
para. 51 (1992) ("There is no universally accepted definition or 'persecution' and
various attempts to formulate such a definition have met with little success.").
48. See JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 106-107 (1991)
(identifying the various individual rights that States have a duty to protect from
persecution, including both the freedom from interference and entitlement to
resources); see also GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 6, at 66-69 (asserting that
persecution includes cruel punishment and degrading treatment).
49. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (discussing the international
prohibition on the recruitment of children under the age of fifteen).
50. See ILO Child Labour Convention, supra note 41, art. 3(a). Article 3(a)
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of a person is a breach of his fundamental human rights.' It is
submitted that the forcible or compulsory recruitment of any child
under eighteen or the recruitment per se of any child under fifteen is
a similar violation and, as such, amounts to persecution within the
meaning of the Refugee Convention. 2 Additionally, even if a child
soldier does not suffer persecution solely because of the fact of his
53
recruitment, his subsequent treatment may amount to such. Physical
maltreatment and sexual assault have been frequently recognized as
types of persecution, as has (less frequently) interference with a
person's private and family life. 4
However, to qualify for refugee status under the Refugee
Convention, it is not enough to show that one has a well-founded
fear of persecution.55 The persecution feared must be on account of
one of the specified grounds (race, religion, nationality, membership

states:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term 'the worst forms of child
labour' comprises: (a) all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such
as the sale or trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or
compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment of children
for use in armed conflict...
Id.
51. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra. note 6, at 69 (demonstrating that slavery,
servitude, and forced or compulsory labour are banned in a number of international
instruments and as a matter of customary international law). See generally Slavery
Convention, Sept. 25, 1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 253; Convention Concerning Forced or
Compulsory Labour, June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55; Final Act of the United
Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on a Supplementary Convention on the
Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to
Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 266 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 8, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (evidencing international
agreements that ban slavery and forced labor).
52. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note
51, art. 8 (prohibiting forced military service).
53. See infra note 54 and accompanying text (explaining various recognised
types of persecution in accordance with the Refugee Convention).
54. See HATHAWAY, supra note 48, at 112-13 (describing risks of civil and
political rights); see also GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 6, at 69 (explaining that due
to the limitlessness of the possible known measures of persecution, assessments of
what qualifies as persecution must be made on a case-by-case basis).
55. See Refugee Convention, supra note 5 art IA(2) (requiring through the
inclusion of a list of grounds for persecution, an articulation of the specific grounds
upon which an individual is basing his or her well-founded fear of persecution).
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of a particular social group or political opinion). 6 It is submitted that
children who are liable to be recruited into armed forces or groups
have a well-founded fear of persecution because of their membership
of a particular social group. 7 The social group in such cases being
children from a particular country or region who, by reason of their
age and (in most cases) gender, are potential recruits (generally,
although not always, adolescent boys)."
What amounts to a "particular social group" for the purposes of
the Refugee Convention has been a subject of controversy.' 9 On the
one hand, it has been argued that the existence of a particular social
group requires a degree of cohesiveness, co-operation, or
interdependence between its members.' On the other hand, a
requirement of cohesiveness has been denied. Persecution on account
of membership of a particular social group means:
persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a
group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic.
The shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or
kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past
experience such as former military leadership or land ownership. The
particular kind of group characteristic that will qualify under this
construction remains to be determined on a case-by-case basis. However,
whatever the common characteristic that defines the group, it must be one

56. See id. (articulating the specific grounds upon which a potential refugee can
claim persecution).
57. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing the classification of
children recruited into armed forces as a "particular social group" for purposes of
the Refugee Convention).
58. See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of a
particular social group in which child soldiers qualify for protection).
59. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text (outlining the debate over the
definition of "particular social group").
60. See Sanchez-Trujillo v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 801 F.2d
1571, 1577 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that "an all-encompassing grouping as the
petitioners identify as a 'class of young, urban, working class males of military age
who had maintained political neutrality' simply is not that type of cohesive,
homogeneous group to which we believe the term 'particular social group' was
intended to apply"); see also R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't, ex parte
Shah, 1 W.L.R. 74, 93 (Staughton L.J.) (Eng. C.A. 1998) (finding that Shah did not
fall under "a particular social group"); see also Gomez v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that "[p]ossession
of broadly-based characteristics such as youth and gender will not by itself endow
individuals with membership of a particular social group").
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that the members of the group either cannot change, or should not be
required to change
because it is fundamental to their individual identities
61
or consciences.

It is this second, expansive definition that has been most widely
adopted. Children would seem to fit into it (as they do not into the
first). 62 Although their common characteristic is not immutable, it is
not something they can change voluntarily. Only time can transform
children into adults. Children recruited into armed forces or groups
are persecuted for reasons of their membership of a particular social
group (children) because it is their very membership of that group
that renders their recruitment persecution.63
Generally, deserters or draft evaders are not seen as eligible for
refugee status because the treatment they fear from the authorities on
account of their actions is considered punishment for their refusal to
obey the law of the land rather than as persecution. 64 Asylum seekers
are required to show that the conscription they sought to avoid was
conducted in a discriminatory manner so as to amount to persecution,
or that their desertion or evasion was to avoid participating in an
illegitimate conflict or (possibly) as the result of a conscientious

61. Matter of Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. Lexis 1985).
62. See, e.g., Applicant A. v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, 142
A.L.R. 331 (1997) (holding that there must be a common unifying element binding
individuals with similar characteristics or aspirations together before there is a
social group of which they are members); Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward,
[1993] S.C.R. 689; In re G.J., [1998] I.N.L.R. 387 (N.Z. Refugee Status
Authority); Shah, 1 W.L.R. 74 (referring to the definition of a "particular social
group" throughout these opinions).
63. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 6, at 69 (inferring that the descriptions of
various forms of persecution are broad). But see IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, GUIDELINES FOR CHILDREN'S

25 (1998) (arguing that "an aged-based claim grounded solely in
the applicant's status as a child or a child from a particular country is unlikely to be
sufficiently discrete to establish persecution on account of that status"), avaiahbh,
at http://www.ilw.com/belluscio/childr-l.pdf (last visited on June 28, 2002).
ASYLUM CLAIMS

64. See HATHAWAY, supra note 48, at 179. Stating that:

persons who claim refugee status on the basis of a refusal to perform military
service are neither refugees per se nor excluded from protection ... the
crucial question is whether the claimant can show that desertion or evasion is
grounded in civil or political status, failing which the claim cannot succeed.
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objection to military service. 65 It is difficult, however, to see this

general rule applying in the case of child draft evaders or deserters.
Recruitment of children under fifteen amounts to persecution per
se, 66 with regard to children between fifteen and eighteen years old,
whilst recruitment does not equal persecution in of itself, the
treatment meted out to recruits frequently does.67
Finally, it is also the case that a person can be at risk of
6
persecution because of his status as a former child soldier.
Particularly because of their use to commit atrocities, emobilized
child soldiers are often objects of hatred and suspicion. 69 Former
child soldiers are a group of persons sharing a common immutable
characteristic; in this case, a shared personal experience.7 ° In such
circumstances, if reprisals amounting to persecutory acts ensue, they
are aimed at former child soldiers because of their membership of a
particular social group.

IV. CHILD SOLDIERS AS WAR CRIMINALS
Consequently, it can be seen that recruitment as a child soldier can
form the basis of an asylum claim. At the same time, one of the
reasons children are recruited may be because they are less
socialized, more docile, and more malleable than adults7 ' and hence
65. See id. at 179-85 (exploring in further depth the requirements for asylum
seekers to establish that their attempt to avoid military conscription was
legitimate).
66. See supra notes 38-39, 54 (noting what qualifies as a violation of
international law and what is considered persecution where children are
concerned).
67. See id. at 179-85 (explaining that the manner in which recruits are treated
may amount to persecution).
68. See infi-a notes 69-70 (noting experiences of child soldiers on the African
continent).
69. See C.P. DODGE & M. RAUNDALEN, REACHING CHILDREN IN WAR: SUDAN,
UGANDA AND MOZAMBIQUE (1991) (describing the treatment of former child
solders in Mozambique).
70. See supra note 61 (illustrating the clear parallel that can be drawn with one
of the examples given in Acosta, that of the shared past experience of "former
military leadership"). See also 19 1. & N. Dec. 211 at 54.
71. See infra pp. 113-15 (discussing appropriate treatment of former child
soldiers under international law).
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are more obedient and more easily coerced into committing
atrocities.7 2 For example, in a report on child soldiers in Liberia,
Human Rights Watch reported a relief worker as saying, "I think [the
warring factions in the Liberian civil war] use kids because the kids
don't understand the risks. And children are easier to control and
manipulate. If the commanding officer tells a child to do something,
he does it."73 A similar view has been taken by Rachael Brett and
Margaret McCallin, who summarized the results of their study of
child soldiers by stating, "the evidence of this book is that children
are recruited predominantly because not enough adult recruits are
forthcoming, or in order to use them as spies or to commit
7' 4
atrocities.
Child soldiers have committed serious atrocities in a number of
recent conflicts, such as those in Mozambique, Liberia, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sierra Leone.75 In Liberia, for
example, child soldiers, some as young as nine years of age, were
responsible for killings, maimings, and rapes, both against members
of opposing armed groups and the civilian population.76
However, most people would agree that children and adults should
not be treated identically in respect of exclusion from refugee status.
This perception would seem to comport with the developing
international law of children's rights.7 7 Article I of the Convention
on the Rights of the Child provides that: "[iun all actions concerning
children... the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration. 71 8 The Article further states that parties to the
72. See infra notes 72-74 (explaining reasons for using children in combat).
73. EASY PREY: CHILD SOLDIERS IN LIBERIA, supra note 14, at 23.
74. BRETT & MCCALLIN, supra note 31, at 167 (emphasis added) (explaining
results of their comprehensive study of child soldiers).
75. See EASY PREY: CHILD SOLDIERS IN LIBERIA, supra note 14, at 23 (noting
that one of the advantages of using children as fighters is that children are very
obedient, don't question their orders, and act out of blind obedience, making it

possible for them to commit such atrocities).
76. See id. at 32 (noting that children are an integral part of attacks on and
occupation of civilian areas).
77. See infra notes 78-83 (describing various international legal provisions
designed specifically in the interests of children).
78. See C.R.C., supra note 13 (documenting the General Assembly's
comments and the Convention's preamble).
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Convention "undertake to ensure the child such protection and care
as is necessary for his or her well-being."7 9 Even before adoption of
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the U.N.H.C.R. Executive
Committee, in its Conclusion No. 47 on refugee children, "stressed
that all action on behalf of refugee children must be guided by the
principle of the best interests of the child." 80 The U.N.H.C.R. applies
the Convention of the Rights of the Child to its own work by using
the rights laid down in the Convention as guiding principles?" It is
submitted that such an approach is the correct one and that the
provisions of the Refugee Convention should be interpreted as far as
possible in conformity with the principles set down in the
Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Children are more vulnerable, more dependent, and have
developmental needs which adults do not have. Given this, the rest of
this paper will discuss the defences child soldiers might have to
efforts to exclude them from refugee status under Article 1F(a).
Two issues, in particular, will be discussed: firstly, the consequences
of children's lack of mental and moral development in terms of their
criminal responsibility for their actions; secondly, the availability of
a defence of duress in respect to child soldiers' responsibility for
international crimes, given that their participation in hostilities
frequently is coerced.83

79. Id. art. 3(2) (describing the responsibilities of States party to the
Convention).
80. See Report of the U.N.H.C.R. Executive Commnittee on Refugee Children,
U.N.H.C.R. Executive Committee, 38th Sess., Conclusion No. 47, para 205, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.96/702 (1987); see also Report of the U.N.H.C.R. Erecutive Conmittee
on Refugee Children, U.N.H.C.R. Executive Committee, 40th Sess., Conclusion
No. 59, para 26, U.N. Doc. A/AC.961737 (1989), reaffirmed by U.N. Doc.
EC/SCP/82, reprinted in Refugee Children: Guidelines on Protection and Care,
U.N.H.C.R., Annex A (2d ed. 1993) [hereinafter Refugee Children] (recognizing
the efforts made by the Office of High Commissioner to respond to children's
needs and noting concern for children's nutritional and educational deficiencies).
81. See Refugee Children, supra note 80, at 4 (providing basic necessities such
as shelter, food, water, and medicine in emergencies).
82. See infra Parts V, VI (discussing infancy and duress as defences for child
soldiers to exclusion from refugee status).
83. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Application of
Article 1(F) to Child-Soldiers, reprinted in, REFUGEE LAW IN CONTEXT: THE
EXCLUSION CLAUSE 43, 44 (Peter J. van Krieken, ed., 1999) (noting that "children
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Before concentrating on available defences, however, one possible
objection must be addressed. It might be argued that to exclude a
person from refugee status under Article IF all one needs to show is
that there are "serious reasons" for thinking that the person has
committed atrocious acts.4 If this were the case, then whether a
person had a defence would be irrelevant. All that would be needed
would be to demonstrate that the person had behaved in a manner
amounting to the actus reus of a war crime, a crime against
humanity, or a crime against peace. It is submitted, however, that
such an approach would be wrong. A crime consists of three
elements: the actus reus (the conduct element), the mens rea (the
mental element), and the absence of any available defence. Article
IF does not refer to atrocities or persecution; it refers to international
crimes.86 What distinguished exclusion proceedings from criminal
proceedings is simply the standard of proof that is applied
(reasonable suspicion rather than beyond reasonable doubt); the
burden of proof remains the same and all elements of the crime must
be proved.

V. INFANCY AS A DEFENCE TO EXCLUSION
Most systems of criminal law take the view that before a person
can be held blameworthy and, therefore, punishable, his behavior
must contain an element of fault.87 In general, to be guilty of a crime,
particularly with regard to serious offences, it is not enough to
simply to have done a particular prohibited act; there must be the

participate in hostilities through abductions, threats to their families, and other

forms of harsh and extreme pressure").
84. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (quoting the language of Article
IF of the Refugee Convention).
85. See generally Martin v. State, 17 So. 2d 427 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994)

(noting that criminal responsibility does not attach without commission of a
voluntary act); United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (finding that, in addition to a voluntary act, intent to commit the specific
crime is required before the accused is liable for the crime).
86. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (noting that article IF of the
Refugee Convention only includes broad categories for denying refugee status).
87. See infra notes 90-91 (discussing criminal liability); see also supra notes
85-86 (explaining essential elements of a crime).
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requisite mnens rea as well as the actus reus.n Consequently, it can be
possible to escape criminal liability by showing that one was lacking

the necessary guilty mind, such as, for example, if the act was
committed accidentally rather than intentionally or while in a state of

automatism. In respect of one class of persons, however, a lack of
mens rea is generally presumed. 89 As Simester and Sullivan state,
"[a]lthough it [the defence of infancy] is a defence of status (no-one
under 10 years of age [the minimum age of criminal responsibility in
England and Wales] can commit a crime), the status is predicated on

assumptions concerning such a person's mental development and
consequent moral irresponsibility for her actions."'
Children are considered doli incapax; incapable of evil. By virtue
of this presumption, they avoid criminal liability for their acts.9 '
Thus, it would appear that there cannot be "serious reasons for
considering" that a child has committed an international crime if that
92
child is under the age of criminal responsibility.

88. See ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 87-88 (3d ed.
1999) (stating "[t]he essence of the principle of autonomy is that the incidence and
degree of criminal liability should respect the choices made by the individual").
The quote continues:
The principle of mnens rea expresses this by stating that defendants should
only be held criminally liable for events or consequences, which they
intended or knowingly risked. Only if they were aware (or, as it is often
expressed 'subjectively' aware), of the possible consequences of their conduct
should they be liable.
Id.
89. See infra note 92 and accompanying text (noting criminal liability of
children in the United Kingdom)
90. A. P. SIMESTER & G.R. SULLIVAN,
DOCTRINE 541 (2000).

CRIMINAL

LAW: THEORY AND

91. See id. at 644-45 Explaining:
Certain mental defences may be incompatible with justified blame. Young
children afford an obvious example. From an early age, children are capable
of aggressive and predatory conduct. Such conduct may need to be restrained
but a degree of maturity, a capacity for self-criticism, is required before
formal pronouncements of blame and punishment are apt.
Id.
92. See generally C.R.C., supra note 13, pmbl. (stating that "-the child, by
reason of physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care"
within the international legal system).
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problem immediately arises: what is the minimum age of criminal
responsibility in respect of war crimes and crimes against humanity ?
Is there, indeed, a minimum age of criminal responsibility in
international law? Here the Convention on the Rights of the Child is
of little help; no minimum age of criminal responsibility is
stipulated. The only provision dealing with the matter is Article 40,
on treatment in penal affairs,94 the relevant provisions of which
declare that State parties to the Convention shall seek to establish a

minimum age below which children shall be presumed to not have
the capacity to infringe the criminal law.95 Consequently, all that the

Convention provides is that States should establish a minimum age
of criminal responsibility, but that it is a matter for each State as to
what that age should be. 96

93. See Application of Article IF to Child Soldiers, supra note 83, at 44
(stating "[e]xclusion decisions rest on evidence of individual liability for
excludable crimes"). The quote continues with :
In order for individual liability to be established, the elements for mens rea
must be present. This means that the excludable acts must have been
committed voluntarily, with some understanding or foresight as to the moral
consequences of those acts, and by a person to whom a moral choice was
available. These elements of a 'guilty mind' are, however, those in respect of
which minors are presumed not to have the requisite mental or emotional
capacity.
Id.
94. See C.R.C., supra note 13, art. 40 (noting that children should be treated in
a manner that takes into account age and potential for reintegration into society):
see also Amnesty International On line, Child Soldiers Treaty Should be Backed by
Defence Bans (Sep. 16, 2000) (stating that the Optional protocol to the Convention
on the Rights of the Child seeks to ban recruiting soldiers who are under the age of
eighteen), at http://web.amensty.org/ai.nsf/print/ IOR510052000?opendocument.
95. C.R.C., supra note 13, art. 40(3)(a).
96. See id. (declaring that "[s]tate parties shall promote the establishment of
laws" that address the minimum age of culpability without proving specific
direction as to the precise laws to be made or the ages to which the laws should
apply). But see Optional Protocol to the Convention of the Rights of the Child
G.A. Res. 54/263 Annex I, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., No. 49, art. 3, U.N. Doe
A/54/49 (2000) (entering into force Feb. 12, 2002) (stating that parties to the
Protocol "shall" raise the age for compulsory military recruitment to eighteen
years).
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The issue had previously arisen during the negotiations of
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol 1).1
There, the representative of Brazil proposed that what is now Article
77(5) of the Protocol 98 be amended to add the sentence "[p]enal
proceedings shall not be taken against, and sentence not pronounced
on, persons who were under sixteen years of age at the time the
offence was committed." 99 The proposed amendment was not
accepted. However, the Italian representative without objecting to the
article as it was adopted, stated that he would have wished that it
included an additional paragraph prohibiting any criminal
prosecution and conviction of children who, at the time of the
commission of the offence, were too young to understand the
consequences of their actions. 100 Committee III, to whom the draft
article had been assigned, agreed that there was a general principle
that a person cannot be convicted of an offence if, at the time he
committed it, he was unable to understand the consequences of his
act. The committee decided, however, to leave the question to
national legislation. It is submitted that such a rule is indeed a
general principle of law, and as such, a rule of international law.",'
Such a conclusion is partially supported by the relevant provisions
of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules of the
Administration of Juvenile Justice ("The Beijing Rules") and their
commentary. 0 2 Of course, the Rules are not per se binding, but they

97. See Protocol I, supra note 38 (defining armed combatants and calling upon

international standards to prevent children who have not attained the age of fifteen
from being recruited or detained as combatants).
98. See id. (stating "[t]he death penalty for an offence related to the armed
conflict shall not be executed on persons who had not attained the age of eighteen
years at the time the offence was committed").
99. O.R. III, P. 307, CDDH/III/325.
100. SeeO.R. XV, P. 219, CDDH/II/SR.59.
101. See GERALDINE VAN BUEREN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON TilE RIGHTS
OF THE CHILD 173 (1995) (stating, "[a]nother basic principle enshrined in
international law is that the concept of criminal responsibility should be related to
the age at which children are able to understand the consequences of their
actions").
Administration of
102. See United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for tile
Juvenile Justice, G.A. Res. 40/33, 40 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. No. 53 at 207, U.N.
Doc. A140/53 (1985) [hereinafter The Beiiing Rules] (providing guidance to States
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provide an indication of the shared thinking of States on the issue.
Rule 4, on the age of criminal responsibility, is not particularly
supportive' 03 merely stating that: "[i]n those legal systems
recognizing the concept of the age of criminal responsibility for
juveniles, the beginning of that age shall not be fixed at too low an
age level, bearing in mind the facts of emotional, mental and
intellectual maturity."' 4 This seems to require even less than the
(subsequent) Convention on the Rights of the Child. However, the
commentary to the rule is more interesting. It sees disparities in
national minimum ages of criminal responsibility as the product of
historical and cultural differences. 05 The comment goes on to say
that:
The modem approach would be to consider whether a child can live up to
the moral and psychological components of criminal responsibility: that
is, whether a child, by virtue of his or her individual discernment and
understanding, can be held responsible for antisocial behavior. If the age
of criminal responsibility is fixed too low or if there is no lower age limit
06
at all, the notion of responsibility would become meaningless.1

In other words, criminal responsibility should only be imposed when
there is some element of fault, that is, sufficient mental and moral
awareness on the part of the individual committing the prohibited act
of the consequences or potential consequences of his actions." 7 The
commentary also links the imposition of criminal responsibility to
granting civil rights, such as the right to marry and the right to
vote. 0 8 Such rights, of course, are frequently only granted from age
for the protection of children's rights and respect for their needs in the
development of separate and specialized systems of juvenile justice).
103. See Beijing Rules, supra note 106, pt. 1 sec. 4.1 (noting that, similar to the
C.R.C. preamble, determination of a child's criminal responsibility should take
into account a child's physical and emotional immaturity).
104. Id. pt. 1 sec. 4.1.
105. See infra notes 111-16 (discussing important factors in creating an
internationally acceptable age for criminal responsibility).
106. Id.
107. See ASHWORTH, supra note 90 (concluding that knowledge of the
consequences of one's actions is required to hold a person accountable for a
crime).
108. See Beiing Rules, supra note 106, pt. I sec. 4.1 ("In general, there is a
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sixteen, seventeen, or eighteen. The commentary ends by stating that
efforts should be made to agree on an international standard
minimum age of criminal responsibility.'°0
This, of course, has not yet happened. However, an interesting
discussion on the subject took place in the European Court of Human
Rights' recent judgment in the cases of T v. United Kingdom and V v.
United Kingdom."0 Both T and V were ten years old when they
abducted and killed a two-year-old boy."' At age eleven, they were
tried in public in an adult court before a judge and jury (although
some allowances were made for their age), convicted of murder and
abduction, and sentenced to an indefinite period of detention."12 They
applied to the European Court of Human Rights on the ground, inter
alia, that their treatment violated Article 3 (the prohibition of torture
and other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) of the
3
European Convention on Human Rights."
The Court considered whether the attribution to the applicants of
criminal responsibility in respect their acts gave rise to a breach of
Article 3, and found that it did not." 4 It found Article 5 of the Beijing
Rules and Article 40(3)(a) of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child of little help.' 1 5 Nor did it consider that there was any common
close relationship between the notion of responsibility for... criminal behavior
and other social rights and responsibilities .... ).
109. See Beijing Rules, supra note 106, pt. I sec. 4.1 ("Efforts should therefore
be made to agree on a reasonable lowest age limit that is applicable
internationally.")
110. 30 EUR. H.R. REP. 121 (2000) (noting that both T v. United Kingdom and V
v. United Kingdom were published under one opinion because they were decided
on the same day and are "virtually identical").
111. See id. at 130 (explaining that T and V were truant from school when they
took a two-year old child from a shopping area).
112. See id. at 131-34 (detailing the trial and sentencing process, which was
conducted "with the formality of an adult trial").
113. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 1, 1998, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, E.T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter European
Convention on Human Rights] (stating that no one shall be subjected to torture or
to inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment).
114. See V. v. United Kingdom, 30 EUR. H.R. REP. at 121 (noting that the vote
was ten to seven).
115. See id. at 145-46 (noting that the Court did not rely on these conventions).
The Court, however, did recommend consideration to raising the minimum age of
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standard as to the minimum age of criminal responsibility among the
member States of the Council of Europe.1 6 Consequently, the Court
held that:
Even if England and Wales is among the few European jurisdictions to
retain a low age of criminal responsibility, the age of 10 cannot be said to
be so young as to differ disproportionately from the age limit followed by

other European States. The Court concludes that the attribution of
criminal responsibility to the applicant does not in itself give rise to a
breach of Article 3 of the Convention. 117

With respect to the Court, however, the fact that a practice is not
unusual is not itself enough to legitimize it. Quite a number of'
common practices breach the human rights of those subjected to
them. The Court's decision on this point seems distinctly underreasoned." 8 However, in a joint, partly dissenting opinion, Judges
Pastor Ridruejo, Ress, Makarcyzk, Tulkens, and Butkevych
disagreed with the majority on the point."' The dissenters stated that
standards could be ascertained from the relevant international
instruments and the practice of the member States of the Council of
Europe.
Only four Contracting States out of 41 are prepared to find criminal
responsibility at an age as low as, or lower than, that applicable in
England and Wales. We have no doubt that there is a general standard
amongst the Member States of the Council of Europe under which there is
criminal responsibility. See id; see also Committee on the Rights of the Child.
Conunents on United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 8th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.34 (1995) (recommending that the United Kingdom
give serious consideration to raising the minimum age of criminal responsibility).
116. See T. v United Kingdom, 30 EUR. H.R. REP. at 146 (noting that the "age
of criminal responsibility is seven in Cyprus, Ireland, Switzerland and
Liechtenstein; eight in Scotland; 13 in France; 14 in Germany, Austria, Italy and
many Eastern European countries; 15 in the Scandinavian States; 16 in Portugal,
Poland and Andorra; and 18 in Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg").
117. Id. at 176.
118. It is also objectionable because, basing its conclusions on the lack of
consensus amongst the contracting States, the Court grants States a wide margin of
appreciation in respect of an issue within the scope of Article 3, which is an
absolute, non-derogatable right.
119. See T. v United Kingdom, 30 EUR. H.R. REP. At 202 (finding that the trial
and sentence contradicted Article 3 of the Convention) (Ridruejo, J., et al.,
dissenting in part).
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a system of relative criminal responsibility beginning at the age of 13
or14 - with special court procedures for juveniles - and providing for full
criminal responsibility at the age of 18 or above... Even if Rule 4 of the
Beijing Rules does not specify a minimum age of criminal responsibility,
the very warning that the age should not be fixed too low indicates that
criminal responsibility and maturity are related concepts. It is clearly the
view of the vast majority of Contracting States that this kind of maturity
is not present in children below the age of 13 or 14.120

Accordingly, taking the age of criminal responsibility together
with the trial procedure and sentencing, there had been a breach of
Article 3 .12t It is submitted, at least with regard to whether there are
any emerging standards as to the minimum age of criminal
responsibility, that the reasoning of the minority of the Court is to be
preferred.
Consideration of the issue has also recently taken place in the
context of the drafting of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone. The statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals for
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda do not include any provisions
governing the age of criminal responsibility ' - and neither tribunal
has indicted any person below the age of eighteen. "3 The issue,
120. Id. at 203 (Ridruejo, J., et al., dissenting in part).
121. See id. at 202. Noting that:
Bringing the whole of weight of the adult criminal processes to bear on
children as young as 11 is, in our view, a relic of times where the effect of the
trial process and sentencing on a child's physical and psychological condition
and development as a human being was scarcely considered, if at all.
Id.
122. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., art. 6 para. 58,
U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (1993) (establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia and stating that individual tribunals will need to establish a
minimum age or mental incapacity at which criminal responsibility will attach);
S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/955
(1994)(establishing an International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda).
123. See Secretary-General's Report on Aspects of Establishing An
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1170, para.
58 (1993) ("The International Tribunal itself will have to decide on various
personal defences which may relieve a person of individual criminal responsibility,
such as minimum age or mental incapacity, drawing upon the general principles of
law recognized by all nations").
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however, was addressed directly in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court. 4 Article 26 of the Statute provides
that, "[t]he Court shall have no jurisdiction over any person who was
under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged commission of the
offence."'' 25 However, it is clear both from the language of the article
and its drafting history that the provision is procedural rather than
substantive in nature. It is simply the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court that is excluded, leaving the treatment of child war
criminals to national courts. 16 Indeed, it appears that one of the
reasons for this exclusion of jurisdiction was to avoid arguments as
to what the minimum age of responsibility of international crimes
27
should be. 1

However, with regard to the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone the issue did have to be grappled with. 28 The civil war in
Sierra Leone had seen extensive use of child soldiers, many of whom
committed serious atrocities, including killings, rapes, and
mutilations. 19 In his report on the establishment of a Special Court,
the U.N. Secretary-General acknowledged the difficulty in
prosecuting child soldiers for war crimes and crimes against
124. See Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 26 (determining the Court's
jurisdiction over minors).
125. Id.
126. See ROGER S. CLARK & OTTO TRIFFTERER, Article 26: Exclusion of
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME"

Jurisdiction Over Persons Under Eighteen, in
STATUTE

OF THE

INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL

COURT:

OBSERVERS'

NOTES,

ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 499 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999). Noting:
Only the jurisdiction of the ICC is excluded... Therefore, it cannot be
assumed that persons under eighteen are not responsible for crimes under
international law in general. Quite the opposite. They are responsible for
crimes for which the ICC has jurisdiction according to article 5 before
national courts under the principle of universality and insofar as national law
provides for such a jurisdiction over minors.
Id.
127. See id. at 497 (stating "[t]he reasons for this exclusion [of the I.C.C.'s
jurisdiction] were to avoid a conflict with regulations in different national
jurisdictions about the age when criminal responsibility should start and how tile
period of growing maturity should be dealt with").
128. See infra note 135 and accompanying text (noting that children below the
age of fifteen were combatants in the Sierra Leone conflict).
129. See Amnesty International,supra note 43, at I (estimating that over 5,000
child combatants have fought in the Sierra Leone conflict).
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humanity, given their dual status as both victims and perpetrators.'
There was considerable dispute between the people of Sierra Leone
and international non-governmental organizations as to how juvenile
offenders should be dealt with.' 3' Consequently, whilst Article 7 of
the draft Statute provided that the Special Court should have
jurisdiction over persons who were fifteen years of age at the time of
the alleged commission of the crime, it also included special
procedures for the prosecution, trial, and punishment of the under32
eighteens. 1
To sum up, it appears that although international law dictates that
States establish a minimum age of criminal responsibility, it does not
purport to tell them what the age should be. It does, however, offer a
number of guidelines. 33 First, the age should not be so low as to
result in the punishment of children who, at the time of the offence,
were too young to understand the consequences of their actions.',
Second, there may be the beginning of a trend (to put it at its highest)
to standardize the minimum age of criminal responsibility
somewhere in the mid-teens (e.g. thirteen, fourteen, fifteen).' This
seems to be the approach taken by the minority in the T and V cases
and by the U.N. Secretary-General when drafting the Special Court's
Statute. 136 Third, even children above the age of criminal
130. See U.N. SCOR, paras. 15(c), 17-18, U.N. Doc. S/20001915 (2000)
(concluding that international humanitarian law is violated when children under
fifteen years old are abducted and forced to participate in hostilities).
131. See id. para. 35 (discussing that there was unanimous consent to find
judicial accountability of children under eighteen years old).
132. See id. at Enclosure art. 7(2)-(3)(treating a person under 18 years of age
with "dignity and a sense of worth" and prioritizing releasing the juvenile
offender).
133. See C.R.C. supra note 13, pmbl. (stating general purposes and guidelines of
the Convention); Beijing Rules, supra note 106, pt I art. 5.1 (noting that the one of
the international juvenile justice should consider both the gravity of the offense
and the personal circumstances of the young offender).
134. See supra notes 90, 112 (discussing the fact that without mental capacity
there cannot be criminal culpability).
135. See supra Parts IV, V (explaining legal approaches to considering a child a
criminal and noting that age should be a defence to such a charge).
136. See United Kingdom, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 170 (stating that it is contrary to
common sense to attribute criminal responsibility to an eleven year old child)
(Conforti, J. & Bekes, J., dissenting in part).
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responsibility should be treated differently from adults.' 7 Taking all
of this into account, however, States are still left with a considerable
amount of discretion.'38 Thus, there is no fixed minimum age of
responsibility for international crimes.
Obviously, this presents somewhat of a problem for the national
decision-maker when deciding whether or not to exclude a child
soldier from the benefits of refugee status under Article IF(a). It may
be, however, that the solution is a simple one. It is now fairly
generally admitted that perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against
humanity are subject to universal jurisdiction.'39 Any State into
whose hands they come may prosecute them. 40 In such cases, States
would apply their own domestic law regarding the minimum age of
criminal responsibility and it appears that, within the broad limits set
out above, this would be perfectly proper under international law.
Given this, it would seem equally proper for States to apply their
own domestic law as to the minimum age of criminal responsibility
when determining whether there are "serious reasons" for believing
an asylum seeker has committed crimes within the scope of Article
1F(a). If a former child soldier seeking asylum was below the
national minimum age at the time he was alleged to have committed
the impugned acts, then his behavior cannot give rise to "serious
reasons" for thinking that he has committed an international crime
because he cannot be considered criminally liable for his actions.
But what about the situation where the minimum age of criminal
responsibility in the State from which the child soldier is fleeing is
lower than that of the State from which he seeks asylum? In such a
case, it might be that the asylum seeker would be potentially
criminally liable for his acts in the State of refuge, but not in the

137. See generally C.R.C., supra note 13, pmbl. (declaring that due to a child's
inherent immaturity, he should be afforded special safeguards and legal
protections).
138. See id. art. 40 (failing to indicate a precise minimum age of responsibility
and leaving such a determination to individual States' and their laws).
139. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 305 (5th

ed., Clarendon Press 1998) (revealing that breaches of international laws of war
may be prosecuted by any state that obtains custody of the violator).
140. See id. at 308 (indicating that international law gives all states the liberty to
prosecute and punish war crimes and crimes against humanity).
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State of flight.' 4 ' As a consequence, he might be deported to face a
prosecution to which he could not be subjected. 4 2 There are two
ways of looking at such a situation. On the one hand, it might be
argued that each State is entitled to determine its own minimum age
of criminal responsibility, and hence, is entitled to enforce that
standard on persons within its jurisdiction.'4 3 The State of refuge, in
other words, is entitled as a matter of public policy to refuse to grant
refugee status to persons that it considers might be war criminals.'
On the other hand, the provisions of Article 1F might be seen not as
conferring a right upon States, but an obligation.'4 5 Indeed, it seems
clear that this is what the provision was intended to do.' 46 To put it
another way, the State of refuge, in applying Article 1F, is acting as
an agent of all the State parties to the Refugee Convention.' 7 It is
enforcing a general policy that undeserving persons should not
receive international protection.' 48 But is a child who would not be
considered criminally responsible for his actions in the place that he
committed them an undeserving person? It might be thought not. If
so, then Article IF should not be applied. In such circumstances,

141. See GOODVN-GILL, supra note 6, at 257-62 (noting that due to absence of
consistent national and international laws and jurisdiction, refugee children may or
may not fall within an umbrella of protection).
142. See Marie Staunton, Children of Genocide. THE TIMES, Aug. 12, 1997
143. See id. at 251 (noting that a State's right to detain a non-national pending
its own determination of entry or removal is beyond question).
144. See id. at 100 (discussing that fact that the Geneva Convention allows a
State the individual responsibility to seek out and to prosecute war criminals and,
as a war criminal, the accused person may be undeserving of refugee status).
145. See James C. Hathaway & Collin J. Harvey, Framing Refugee Protection
In The New World Disorder, 34 CORNELL lNT'L L.J. 247 (2001) (discussing
generally the provisions of Article IF and their implications for asylum seekers).
146. See discussion infra pp. 105-08 (noting the fact that Article IF does not
apply to children combatants). But see James C. Hathaway & Collin J. Harvey,
FramingRefugee Protection hI The New IfWorld Disorder,34 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
247 (2001) (discussing generally the provisions of Article I F and their
implications for asylum seekers).
147. See supra Part I and notes 149-52 (discussing application of the Refugee
Convention).
148. See id. (stating that, in general, those who commit war crimes are not
deserving of refugee status).
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decision-makers should apply the domestic law of the State of
flight. 149

VI. DURESS AS A DEFENCE TO EXCLUSION
But what if the child soldier is above the minimum age of criminal
responsibility of both the State of refuge and the State of flight? In
such a case, it would seem that Article IF is generally applicable.""
There is, however, one reason in particular wfiy the child might be
excluded from the ambit of the provision. Child soldiers'
participation in war crimes and other atrocities is often coerced.'' In
such circumstances, if faced with prosecution for their actions, they
might be able to avail themselves of the defence of duress by
threats.5 2 If successfully asserted, such a defence acts as an excuse,
avoiding criminal liability. In exclusion proceedings, there would not
be "serious reasons" for considering that the child had committed a
war crime or a crime against humanity.
However, it has been argued that, although a defence to criminal
prosecution, duress cannot be pleaded in the context of exclusion
proceedings. Certainly, this has been the view of the U.S. courts. 5 '
Such a view derives from the U.S. Supreme Court's judgment in
Fedorenko v. United States.'54 In that case, the U.S. government
successfully brought denaturalization proceedings against Fedorenko
on the basis that, as a concentration camp guard during World War

149. See Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Report of the Expert of the
Secretary-General, Ms. Gra~a Machel, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 108, para. 22,
U.N. Doc. A/51/306 (1996) (evaluating the impact of armed conflict on children).
The fact that child soldiers are often as much victims as perpetrators of human
rights violations adds force to this argument. Id.
150. See supra Parts IV and V (discussing application of article IF exclusion
clause for war criminals and age as a defence to exclusion).
151. See supra Part II (noting that most child soldiers do not fight willingly).
152. See infra notes 153-200 (discussing examples of how child soldiers can
assert the duress defence).
153. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981) (noting that it was not
congressional intent to allow a concentration camp guard, whether service as such
was voluntary or involuntary, to remain in the United States).
154. 449 U.S. 490 (1981) (holding that the Displaced Persons Act of 1948
("D.P.A.") does not apply to those who helped enemy forces).
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II, he had participated in the persecution of camp inmates.'"
Fedorenko argued that he did so under duress, but the Supreme Court
ruled that duress was not an available defence. 6 Fedorenko was
applied to asylum claims by the Board of Immigration Appeals in
Rodriguez-Majano.157 There, it was argued that the applicant was
ineligible for asylum on the ground that he had engaged in the
persecution of others. 158 The applicant admitted that he had been a
member of the guerrillas in El Salvador, but argued that he had been
forced to join them and had deserted after two months. 15 9 The Board,

however, held that, "[t]he participation or assistance of an alien in
persecution need not be of his volition to bar him from relief [from
deportation]",160 although on the facts of the applicant's case, the
court found that the guerrillas had not engaged in persecution.' 6'
However, the Supreme Court reached its decision in Fedorenko
solely on its reading of relevant domestic legislation. 62 The Court
saw the issue as one of statutory construction and did not purport to
lay down any general rules as to the status of the defence of duress as
a matter of international law.' 63 Delivering the opinion of the Court,

155. See id. at 493 (stating that by not disclosing his role in World War II,
Defendant procured his visa by making a willful misrepresentation).
156. See id. at 512 (noting that Congress did not limit visa exclusion to those
who "voluntarily assisted enemy forces," thus, "all those who assisted in the
persecution of civilians [are] ineligible .. ").
157. See Matter of Rodriguez-Majano, 19 1. & N. Dec. 811 (B.I.A. 1988).
158. See id. (noting that the persecution does not need to be of the person's own
actions); see also 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(B)(1982) (stating that "the term
'refugee' does not include any person who ordered, incited, assisted or otherwise
participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, nationality,
religion, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion").
159. See id. (indicating that the defendant stated that he was taken from his
home and forced to participate in burning cars and spreading propaganda).
160. Id. para. (2).
161. See id. (holding that the evidence suggests that the respondent engaged
only in actions that were the natural consequence of civilian strife and that such
harm does not amount to persecution).
162. See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 490 (relying on the Displaced Persons Act of
1948); see also Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 774, 62 Stat. 1009
(1948) (noting that the 1948 Displaced Persons Act excluded people eligible for
immigration that had helped enemy forces in persecuting civilians).
163. See generally Abbe L. Dienstag, Fedorenko v United States: War Crimes,
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Judge Marshall stated that:
[W]e conclude that the District Court's construction of the Act was
incorrect. The plain language of the Act mandates precisely the literal
interpretation that the District Court rejected: an individual's service as a
concentration camp armed guard - whether voluntary or involuntary made him ineligible for a visa. That Congress was perfectly capable of
adopting a 'voluntariness' limitation where it felt that one was necessary
is plain from comparing § 2(a) with § 2(b), which excludes only those
individuals who 'voluntarily assisted the enemy forces ... in their
operations . . . .' Under traditional principles of statutory construction, the
deliberate omission of the word 'voluntary' from § 2(a) compels the
conclusion that the statute made all those who assisted in the persecution
of civilians ineligible for visas. 164

In fact, the wording of § 2(a) and (b) of the 1948 Displaced
Persons Act was taken verbatim from the 1946 Constitution of the
International Refugee Organisation ("I.R.O."), the predecessor to the
U.N.H.C.R.165 Persons not of concern to the I.R.O. included, " other
persons who can be shown: (a) to have assisted the enemy in
persecuting civil populations of countries, Members of the United
Nations; or (b) to have voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since
the outbreak of the Second World War in their operations against the
United Nations.' 66
The definitions in the Displaced Persons Act were adopted in
conformity with the I.R.O. Constitution.' 67 Given this, arguments
from presumed congressional intent do not appear particularly
compelling. Indeed, there is evidence to show that the Supreme
Court's interpretation does not conform to that of the drafters of the
the Defense of Duress, and American Nationality Law 82 COLUM. L. RFV. 120
(1982) (discussing extensively the case and its implications).
164. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512.
165. Constitution of the International Refugee Organization and Agreement on
Interim Measures to be Taken in Respect of Refugees and Displaced Persons, Dec.
15, 1946, 18 U.N.T.S. 283 [hereinafter International Refugee OrganizationI
(defining refugee status and the role of signatory states concerning refugees in the
aftermath of World War II).
166. Id. at 20.
167. See Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 775, § 2(b), 62 Stat. 1009
(1948) (defining the term "displaced person" based on the definition of this term in
Annex I of the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization ).
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I.R.O. Constitution. 68 A footnote to Article 2(b) indicates that the
word "voluntarily" was used to exclude from the scope of the
provision officials who continued to carry out their normal duties
under enemy occupation or persons who cared for sick and wounded
enemies. 169 The term was not intended to distinguish between actions
performed freely or whilst under duress. 0
The Office of the U.N.H.C.R. succeeded the I.R.O. as the
principal United Nations agency concerned with refugees, whilst
who is a refugee is now defined by the Refugee Convention.' 7 ' As
previously discussed, the Refugee Convention's definition of those
persons excluded from refugee status by virtue of their previous
7 Article IF
conduct is somewhat different from that of the l.R.O."'
speaks specifically of "crimes," rather than of persecution, which
would seem to be a clear implication that general part of criminal law
should apply and that, accordingly, duress should be an available
defence to attempts to exclude from refugee status.' It is submitted

168. See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512 (revealing that Congress intended to
exclude all persons who served in a concentration camp or persecuted civilians,
whether their service was voluntary or involuntary).
169. See International Refugee Organization, supra note 165, at 20 n. 1. Stating:
Mere continuance of normal and peaceful duties, not performed with the
specific purpose of aiding the enemy against the Allies or against the civil
population of territory in enemy occupation, shall not be considered to
constitute 'voluntary assistance.' Nor shall acts of general humanity, such as
care of wounded or dying, be so considered except in cases where help of this
nature given to enemy nationals could equally well have been given to Allied
nationals and was purposely withheld from them.

Id.
170. See id. at 20 (allowing non-combatants to continue with their regular
existence).
171. See Refugee Convention supra note 5, at 152 (explaining that, for the

purposes of this Convention, the term "refugee" shall apply to any person who fits
the criteria set out in subsections A (1) and A (2) of Article 1).
172. See supra Introduction and Part I (explaining that categories of persons and
prior actions that are excluded from refugee status).
173. See id. at 156 (inferring that by including non-political crimes as a
disqualification to refugee status and thus, should make duress a defence to those
non-political crimes for the purpose of gaining refugee status).
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that not only are the U.S. decisions wrong in principle, but they are
"'
in no way relevant to the interpretation of Article IF. 74
Duress differs as a defence from infancy. Although formally a
status defence, infancy derives its rationale from a belief that
children lack the necessary mental and moral development to fully
comprehend the consequences of their actions.'75 Accordingly, a lack
of mens rea is presumed. 7 6 A defendant claiming duress, on the other
hand, is not saying that he did not intend to do what he did, 177 but
rather that, faced with an imminent and unavoidable threat aimed at
persuading him to commit an offence, he had no viable alternative
but to do as he was told. 78 The rationale for the duress defence was
well put by Judge Murnaghen, sitting in the Irish Court of Criminal
Appeal. Duress is a defence because "threats of immediate death or
serious personal violence so great as to overbear the ordinary power
of human resistance should be accepted as a justification for acts
'
which would otherwise be criminal."'

79

174. See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 530 (describing how the majority incorrectly
interpreted the Displaced Persons Act and the International Refugee Organization)
(Stephens, J., dissenting).

175. See SMITH AND

HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW

237 (8th ed. 1996) (breaking

children into categories based upon their age, the youngest being children under
seven-years-old who are exempt from criminal responsibility under common law).
176. See id. at 238 (demonstrating that as a child grows older, it is easier fbr the
prosecutor to prove a child has the mens rea for criminal responsibility).
177. See id. at 238. Stating:
[W]hen [the] D[efendant] pleads duress (or necessity) he admits that he was
able to control his actions and chose to do the act with which he is charged,
but denies responsibility for doing so. He may say, 'I had no choice' but that
is not strictly true. The alternative to committing the crime may have been so
exceedingly unattractive that no reasonable person would have chosen it; but
there was a choice.
Id.
178. See Regina. v. Graham, I W.L.R. 294 (Eng. C.A. 1982) (explaining that in
English law, the threats must have been such that "a sober person of reasonable
firmness" would not have resisted them).
179. Attorney-General v. Whelan, 1934 I.R. 518, 526 (Ir. C.C.A.) (holding that
duress is a defence to receiving stolen goods under threat of immediate death); see
also Paul H. Robinson, CriminalLaw Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 199 (1982) (discussing the distinction between justification and excuse).
Strictly speaking, in most circumstances duress provides and excuse for, rather
than a justification of, the defendant's conduct.
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In such circumstances, we cannot seriously expect individuals to
refuse to comply with the demands made upon them, and given this,
they should not be held criminally responsible for their actions. s°
Morally, such a refusal might be laudable, but it is so because it goes
beyond what might reasonably be expected of a person And, in such
circumstances, the criminal law will not demand that we all be
heroes.1"' Although the law does not approve of the conduct of the
person acting under duress, it is not considered blameworthy; and,
hence, punishable. 182 It is difficult to see why this rationale should
not apply in exclusion proceedings. Article IF is concerned with
persons "undeserving" of the benefits of refugee status.'83 Persons
who have committed crimes under duress are more unfortunate than
undeserving.""4

In fact, duress has been successfully pleaded in opposition to
efforts to exclude a person from refugee status. 85 However, an issue
180. See ASHWORTH, supra note 88 at 231. Stating:
[D]uress operates as an excuse, recognizing the dire circumstances which
[the] D[efendant] was faced and conceding a complete defence where
D[efendant] responded in a way that did not fall below the standard to be
expected of the reasonable citizen. On this rationale the person of reasonable
firmness assumes a central role, not so much in announcing a standard that
should be followed, or reducing the risk of false defences, but rather in
recognizing that D[efendant] was not lacking in responsibility for what was
done. [The] D[efendant] is excused for giving way to the threat or danger
when resistance could not reasonably be expected in the circumstances which means that self-sacrifice is required in certain (lesser) situations.
Id.
181. See J.C. SMITH, JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE IN CRIMINAL LAW 94 (1989)
(stating with regard to the unavailability of duress as a defence to murder,
"[h]eroism is a splendid thing but it is usually considered to be conduct going
beyond the call of duty, which is why the hero is awarded a medal. A person
should not be liable to life imprisonment for failing to be a hero.").
182. See id. at 79 (arguing that many acts performed under duress might be
technically illegal, but no one considers that one should condemn themselves in
order to save another).
183. See supra Part I (explaining that where there are serious concerns over a
person's prior conduct, he may not be deserving of refugee status).
184. See id. at 96 (noting that a responsible person can behave in a morally
acceptable way and still run afoul of the law when acting under duress).
185. See HATHAWAY, supra note 48, at 218 (citing FelLr Salatiel Nu1iez Veloso,
Immigration Appeal Board Decision 79-1017, C.L.I.C. Notes 11.5, August 24,
1979, regarding the Canadian Immigration Appeals Board decision where under
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still arises in relation to the ambit of the defence. 1 6 The defence of,
duress is not the same in all legal systems. Whereas, in general,
duress may constitute a complete defence to all criminal charges in
civil law systems,"8 7 in almost all common law systems it is not a
defence to charges of murder. 8 This might be thought to be
unsatisfactory. 8 9 Take one hypothetical example. Two child soldiers
face prosecution in a State with a common law legal system that does
not permit duress as a defence to murder. Both are over the minimum
age of criminal responsibility and are each required by their
commanders, under threat of immediate execution, to cut off a
person's hands. In each case, the intention was not to kill the person,
but merely to inflict grievous bodily harm so that they would serve as
living examples of the armed group's ruthlessness towards its
opponents. The person mutilated by Child A, however, dies of his
wounds, whilst the person mutilated by Child B does not. In that
case, Child A could be prosecuted for murder (as an intention to
inflict grievous bodily harm is sufficient to provide the mens rea for
the crime of murder)-and could not rely on the defence of duress,
pain of execution, Nufiez participated in crimes against humanity (torture); but,
because his actions had been committed under duress, he was not excluded from
refugee status under Article IF).
186. See id. at 218 (commenting that a consideration of whether human
suffering induced by a person claiming duress should outweigh the perpetrators
own well-being).
187. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, 1997 International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-96-22-T, 1997 WL 33341547, para. 59 (U.N.
I.C.T. App. Ct. 1997) (detailing duress as a defence in the penal codes of France,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Finland,
Venezuela, Nicaragua, Chile, Panama, Mexico, and Yugoslavia).
188. See Abbott v. The Queen, I A.C. 755 (P.C. 1977) (appeal taken from
Trinidad and Tobago) (holding of the Privy Council that under English law, duress
is not a defence to murder); see also R. v. Howe, I A.C. 417 (H.L.(E) 1987)
(procuring murder as opposed to actually committing it does not mean that the
prohibition on duress as a defence to murder does not apply, duress is not available
as a defence for principals in the first or second degree); see also Reg. v. Gotts, I
A.C. 412 (H.L.(E) 1992) (stating that the value of human life is so sacred that
duress is not available as a defence to murder under common law).
189. See generally Alan Reed, Duress and Provocation as Excuses to Murder:
Salutaiy Lessonsfiom Recent Anglo-American Jurisprudence6 J. TRANSNAT'i. L.
& POL'Y 51 (1996) (comparing the duress defence in England and the United
States while noting the inconsistencies and anomalies present in the applicable
case law).
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but Child B, charged with inflicting grievous bodily harm, could.'O

Indeed, the present situation in English law has been subject to
extensive and cogent academic criticism.' 9' However, the policy

reasons given by the House of Lords for maintaining the distinction
between murder and attempted murder would seem to apply with
equal force to murder-type crimes, such as war crimes and crimes
against humanity involving killing. 92 In these situations, given the
sanctity afforded to human life, it may be that the law does require
that we all be heroes and refuse to save our own lives at the expense
of others'. 193
Certainly this was the view taken by the majority of the Appeals
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia in the Erdemnovic case. " Erdemovic had been charged
with a crime against humanity and a war crime in respect of his
participation in a Bosnian Serb firing squad following the fall of
Srebrenica in 1995. 91 Before a Trial Chamber of the Tribunal, he
pleaded guilty to the charge of a crime against humanity, but added
that he would have been killed had he refused to join the firing
squad. 96 Erdemovic told the court:

190. See SMITH & HOGAN, supra note 175, at 94 (giving a similar example).
191. See e.g., id. at 73-98 (discussing necessity and duress as a defence).
192. See Peter Alldridge, Duress, Murder and the House of Lords, 52 J. CRIM.
L. 186 (1988) (analyzing recent decisions by the House of Lords that duress is not
a defence to murder).
193. See Reg. v. Howe, 1 A.C. at 438 (noting the analyses of Lord Griffiths and
Lord Mackay of Clashfern in that duress is not, and has never been, a defence to
murder under common law).
194. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, 1997 International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-96-22-T, 1997 WL 33341547 (U.N. I.C.T. App.
Ct. (Yug.) 1997) (stating that in light of international case law, humanitarian law,
and the policies of civilized nations, duress is not a complete defence to crimes
against humanity) (Cassese P. and Stephen J., dissenting).
195. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, 1997 International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-96-22-T, 1997 WL 33341545, para. 12 (U.N.
I.C.T. App. Ct. 1997) (participating with other members of his unit,
ir.
Erdemovic shot and killed hundreds of Muslim male civilians at the Pilica
collective farm in Srebrenica on or about July 16, 1995).
196. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, 1997 International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia in the Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-96-22-T, 1997 WL
2014005, para. 14 (U.N. I.C.T. Sentencing Ct. 1997) (pleading guilty to the crimes
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Your Honour. I had to do this. If I had refused, I would have been killed
together with the victims. When I refused, they told me: 'If you are sorry
for them, stand up, line up with them and we will kill you too.' I am not
sorry for myself but for my family my wife and son who then had nine
17
months, and I could not refuse because then they would have killed me. 9

The Trial Chamber accepted Erdemovic's guilty plea and
sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment. t98 Erdemovic appealed
against his sentence. 99 In determining his appeal, the Appeals
Chamber examined whether a plea of duress, rather than serving as a
mitigating factor, could serve as a defence to war crimes and crimes
against humanity. 2°
The majority of the Appeals Chamber (Judges McDonald, Vohrah
and Li) considered that it could not. 0 Judges McDonald and Vohrah
did so largely on the grounds put forward by the British House of
Lords.20 2 Judge Li accepted the submissions of the prosecutor that
against humanity, Mr. Erdemovic maintained that he had no choice but to kill
civilians or die alongside them).
197. Id.
198. See id. para. 6 (sentencing Erdemovic to ten years of imprisonment after he
pleaded guilty to one count of crimes against humanity).
199. See Erdemovic, 1997 WL 33341545, para. II (explaining that the
Defendant was appealing his sentence on the grounds of duress, which he claimed
should excuse him of serving prison time, or mitigating circumstances, which
should reduce the amount of time to be served).
200. See Erdemovic, 1997 WL 33341547, para. 32 (beginning the study between
the availability of duress as a defence to murder, war, crimes, and crimes against
humanity).
201. See id. para. 88 (concluding that accepting duress as a complete defence to
crimes against humanity would undermine the very foundation of international
law).
202. See id. para. 75. Stating that:
Concerns about the harm which could arise from admitting duress as a
defence to murder were sufficient to persuade a majority of the House of'
Lords and the Privy Council to categorically deny the defence in the national
context to prevent the growth of crime and the impunity of miscreants. Are
they now insufficient to persuade us to similarly reject duress as a complete
defence in our application of laws designed to take account of humanitarian
concerns in the arena of brutal war, to punish perpetrators of crimes against
humanity and war crimes, and to deter the commission of such crimes in the
future? If national law denies recognition of duress as a defence in respect of
the killing of innocent persons, international criminal law can do no less than
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post-World War II tribunals had laid down a rule of customary
international law that duress could only be pleaded in mitigation.20 3

In a separate and dissenting opinion, however, President Cassese
gave a lengthy and convincing
Judges McDonald and Vohrah,
discover any international rules
valid defence for international

rebuttal of this argument.2 ,1 Like
President Cassese was unable to
determining whether duress was a
crimes involving killing.205 Unlike

them, however, he held that it was a general principle of law that
duress did amount to a defence to criminal behavior, and if no
exception to the rule could be found, then it should apply.2: Judge
Stephen also dissented, but on narrower grounds. He found that the
reasons given by national courts for not permitting duress as a
defence to charges of murder did not refer to situations where an
individual, acting under duress, killed persons who would have been
killed regardless of that individual's participation in their deaths. -m

What is even less clear, however, is whether the rule laid down by
the majority of the Appeals Chamber in Erdemovic as to the

unavailability of a defence of duress to international crimes

match that policy since it deals with murders often of far greater magnitude.
Id.
203. See id. para. 5 (noting that although duress has been used as a mitigating
factor, the authority is sparse and often not international in character, but rather a
reflection of an individual state's law).
204. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, 1997 International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-96-22-T, 1997 WL 33341544, paras. 20-29 (U.N.
I.C.T. App. Ct. 1997) (stating the majority misinterpreted the case law and
furthermore, the tribunals cited were not of international character) (Cassese, J.,
dissenting).
205. See id. para. 47 (differing from the majority opinion by stating that the law
of duress is more realistic and flexible, a rule based on what society can reasonably
except from its members) (Cassese, J., dissenting).
206. See Erdemovic, 1997 WL 33341547, para. 66 (finding that it was a general
principle of law that an accused person is less blameworthy and less deserving of
full punishment when he performs a prohibited act under duress) (MacDonald, J. &

Vohrah, J.).
207. See Erdemovic, 1997 WL 33341549, para. 64 (discussing the dissenting
opinion of Judge Stephen in that accepting duress as a defence in international law
would not harm the fundamental concepts of the common law, such as in
Erdemovic's case, where he was one member of an execution squad) (Stephen, J.,
dissenting).

1168

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.

[17:1131

involving killing is meant to be binding on national courts. 118 It is
suggested that it is not.2 °9 In the Appeals Chamber, only Judge Li
considered that international law governed the issue,"" and his
reasons for so concluding were comprehensively exploded by
President Cassese. 1 Judges McDonald, Vohrah, Cassese, and
Stephen were all agreed that there were no rules of international law
regarding the availability of duress as a defence to the killing of
innocent persons. 21 2 However, as judges in a court of criminal appeal,
it was not open to them to declare a non liquet.213 All four judges

agreed that they had to make a decision and determine Erdemovic's
appeal. 214 It was in respect of the process by which they were entitled
215
to come to a decision that they disagreed.

208. See Er-demovic, 1997 WL 33341547, para. 75 ("Whilst reserving our
comments on the appropriate rule for domestic national contexts, we cannot but
stress that we are not, in the International Tribunal, concerned with ordinary
domestic crimes.")(McDonald, J. & Vohrah, J., dissenting).
209. See id. (noting that the scope of the crimes addressed by the International
Tribunal, war crimes and crimes against humanity, are of a different scale than
domestic crimes and as such, the laws are meant to protect the weak and
vulnerable, thus serving a different purpose than domestic law).
210. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, 1997 International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-96-22-T, 1997 WL 33341546, para. 4 (U.N.
I.C.T. App. Ct. 1997) (commenting that the governing authority should be the
decisions of military tribunals, both national and international, applying
international law) (Li, J., dissenting). This seems to be a reference to Article
38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which lists "judicial
decisions ... as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of [international]
law." Id.
211. See Erdemovic, 1997 WL 33341544, paras. 20-29 (continuing analysis of
post World War II military tribunals) (Cassese, J., dissenting).
212. See Erdenovic, 1997 WL 33341547, para. 55 (stating "it is our considered
view that no rule may be found in customary international law regarding the
availability or the non-availability of duress as a defence to a charge of killing
innocent human beings") ( McDonald, J. & Vohrah, J.).
213. See id. para. 57 (finding that when international tribunals are faced with an
absence of applicable law, it is their duty to determine the general legal principle
based upon the laws of civilized nations).
214. See id. (determining that despite an absence of clear authority, the Tribunal
would rule on duress as a defence to murder and crimes against humanity).
215. See id. (demonstrating that the interpretation of many legal systems
inevitably leads to differences of opinion).
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Since Erdenovic, however, the issue has been addressed in the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 31 of the
Statute provides, inter alia, that:
In addition to other grounds for excluding criminal responsibility
provided in this Statute, a person shall not be criminally responsible if,
at
the time of that person's conduct... the conduct which is alleged to
constitute a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been caused by
duress resulting from a threat of imminent death or of continuing or
imminent serious bodily harm against that person or another person, and
the person acts necessarily and reasonably to avoid this threat, provided
that the person does not intend to cause a greater harm than the one
sought to be avoided.2t 6

The Rome Statute is, of course, only binding on State parties to the
treaty. 27 Although it might be argued that Article 3 1(1)(d) reflects a
rule of customary international law, if so, at least according to the
majority of the Yugoslavia Tribunal Appeals Chamber in Erdeniovic,
it is a rule that has crystallized remarkably quickly.218 What is of
particular interest, however, is that the rule, as enunciated in the
Rome Statute, applies in relation to all crimes within the jurisdiction
of the International Criminal Court.

9

That is, it applies in relation to

war crimes and crimes against humanity involving killing. -2" To this
extent, Erdemovic has been overruled. Consequently, it is difficult to
argue that international law prohibits a defence of duress to charges
of war crimes and crimes against humanity involving killing. -'

216. Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 31.
217. See id. art. 126 (inferring that the Rome Statute came into force on 1 July
2002).
218. See Albin Eser, Article 31: Groundsfor Ercluding CriminalResponsibility,
in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 499 (Otto Trifflerer ed., 1999)

(emphasizing that the provision cannot easily be seen as marking the
crystallization of a rule of customary international law).
219. See Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 31 (noting that there is no war crimes
exception to grounds for excluding criminal responsibility).
220. See Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 23 (stating that "'a
person convicted
by the Court may be punished only in accordance with this statute").
221. See id. art. 31 (showing that the Rome Statute clearly allows duress as a
defence).
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Attempts have been made to apply international standards in cases
where persons seeking to avoid exclusion from refugee status have
pleaded that they acted under duress. In Ramirez v Minister of
Employment and Immigration,2 2 the Canadian Federal Court of
Appeal applied Article 9 of the Draft Code of Offences Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind provisionally adopted by the
International

Law

Commission in

1987,23 which

imported a

requirement of proportionality between the harm inflicted and the
harm sought to be avoided. 2 The Court concluded that Ramirez
could not rely on the defence of duress as, by his own admission, the
harm he inflicted was in excess of that which would otherwise have
been directed at him.2 5 The Draft Code, however, predates the
Yugoslav tribunal's decision in Erdemovic and has been superseded
by the Rome Statute. 226 It is accordingly difficult to say that it reflects

customary international law.227
If no rule of international law governs the issue, States have
freedom of action; they can apply their own rules regarding the scope
of the defence. 228 A national decision-maker, when determining
222. 89 D.L.R. 173 (1992) (finding that a former member of the Salvadoran
army who observed the killing and torture of prisoners and non-combatants could
be denied refugee statue based on the belief that he had committed war crimes or
crimes against humanity).
223. See Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security oj Mankind,
39th Sess., 2 Y.B. Int'l Comm'n 11, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1987/Add.I (part 2)
(1987) [hereinafter Draft Code] (highlighting that the Draft Code sought to provide
exceptions to criminal responsibility such as incapacity and self defence).
224. See HATHAWAY, supra note 48, at 218 (criticizing the decision in Niufiez for
failing to require such a condition).
225. See Ramirez, 89 D.L.R. at 188 (quoting from the Draft Code in that
coercion can be used as a defence when an individual is motivated to perpetrate an
act in order to avoid grave and imminent danger).
226. See Draft Code, supra note 223 (highlighting that the only provision
relating to defences in the Draft Code as adopted was Draft Article 14, which
provided that "[t]he competent court shall determine the admissibility of defences
in accordance with the general principles of law, in the light of character of each
crime").
227. See id. (inferring in the commentary to the draft article that a wateringdown of the original provision was a result of disagreements over the scope of the
defence of duress).
228. See id. para. 40 (noting that the competent court decides if international law
applies, but that the court can resort to analogous national law).
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whether there are serious reasons for thinking that a particular child
soldier committed an international crime, should apply his own
domestic law regarding the existence and ambit of the defence of
duress. 229 Again, this cannot be seen as satisfactory. As with the
defence of infancy, if the scope of the defence of duress varies in the
State of refuge and the State of flight, the question arises as to which
2
law should be applied.

30

With regard to the the particular situation of child soldiers,
however, three points deserve emphasis. First, the fact that a child
soldier was recruited by coercive means is insufficient to found
duress.231 It must be shown that there was a direct threat aimed at
inducing the child soldier to commit the particular crime with regard
to which his exclusion from refugee status is sought and that led him
to commit that crime.232 Second, it is probably the case that voluntary
membership of an organization notorious for committing atrocities
prevents use of the defence of duress in cases when a member of
such a group is threatened to induce him to commit such crimes (the
doctrine of prior fault).233 Such a rule has been applied in domestic
proceedings regarding the membership of violent criminal gangs and
paramilitary organizations. 2 3 While the rationale for the rule would
seem to apply with equal, if not greater force, with regard to war
crimes and crimes against humanity, whether it should apply in

229. See id.
230. See Peter Rowe, Duress as a Defense to War Crimes After Erdemovic: A
Laboratoiyfor a Permanent Court? 1 Y.B. INT'L .HUMANITARIAN L. 210, 213

(1998) (commenting on the uncertainty of any defences being accepted by the
International Criminal Tribunal).
231. See supra Part VI (defining when duress may be used as a defence).
232. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 31(d) (noting that a person
may be excluded from criminal responsibility under the theory of duress if the
crime was committed as a result of "a threat of imminent death or of continuing or
imminent serious bodily harm... and the person acts necessarily and
reasonably...").
233. See Reg. v. Fitzpatrick, (1977) (N.I. C.C.A.) (stating that a person who
voluntarily joins an illegal organization, submitting himself to illegal compulsion,
cannot rely on the duress as an excuse).
234. See R v. Sharp, 1987 Q.B. 853 (Eng. C.A.) (holding that the defence of
duress was unavailable to a person who voluntarily joined a criminal organization
or gang).
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relation to child soldiers is more doubtful. 23 5 The recruitment of all
children under fifteen years old is unlawful.236 This can be seen as
indicating that children under fifteen-years-old are not viewed as
having the maturity to make a real choice whether or not to join an
armed group. 23 7 If so, it would seem unfair to penalize them for
joining a criminal one. Application of the rule to children of fifteen
years or over remains, however, an open question, as only the
23 8
conscription of such children is prohibited.
Finally, the obverse of the third point is that a child soldier should
not be penalized simply because he was a member of an armed group
whose members committed atrocities. 239 He must have, in some way,
whether as principal or accessory, participated in such offences. 40
Article lF(a) is clear: there must be serious reasons for considering
that the person committed an international crime.241 Membership of
an organization is not a sufficient reason for excluding a person from
refugee status.242 In such circumstances, the issue should not arise
and, accordingly, there should be no need to raise any defence of
duress (or, indeed, infancy).

235. See State v. Bradbury, 1967 S.A. 387 (A) (relying on moral
blameworthiness more than the actual deed, the court found duress a mitigating
factor to a gang member sentenced to death; on appeal the sentence was reduced to
life imprisonment).
236. See C.R.C., supra note 13, art. 38 (noting that the recruitment of children
under fifteen years of age violates the Convention).
237. See id. arts. 34, 38 (requiring nations to prevent children from taking part in
armed conflicts).
238. See id. art. 38(3) (asking states to give priority to soldiers who are at least
eighteen years of age).
239. See Ramhiez, 89 D.L.R. at 180 (stating "[m]ere membership of an
organization which from time to time commits international offences is not
normally sufficient for exclusion from refugee status").
240. See id. (showing that although the judgement is worded generally, it is clear
that only persons criminally liable, including principal actors and accomplices, can
be excluded from refugee status).
241. See supra Part I (discussing section IF requirements in detail).
242. See id. (finding that mere presence at the scene is also not enough to
exclude a person from refugee status).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Finally, it is important to remember that even if a child soldier is
excluded from refugee status under Article IF(a), it by no means
follows that he can necessarily be deported. 23 Article IF permits the
exclusion from refugee status of those in respect of whom, although
they have a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, there are serious reasons for considering have
committed crimes against peace, war crimes or crimes against
humanity. 244 Such persons may, however, be protected against
refoulement for other reasons.245
In particular, the European Convention on Human Rights ' 6 and
the Convention Against Torture2 47 prohibit the deportation of any
person when there are substantial grounds for believing that the
individual will be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment in the receiving State. 28 This obligation is
absolute. 249 It is not affected by the individual's conduct.2 This was
243. See Refugee Convention, supra note 5, at 156 (noting that disqualification

as a refugee does not mean that other factors, such as being subjected to torture or
other degrading treatment, will preclude a person from expulsion).
244. See id. (understanding that the text does not show any exceptions for those
suspected of crimes against humanity to gain refugee status).
245. See ifira note 247 and accompanying text (explaining what some of those
other reasons might include).
246. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 113, art. 3 (attempting
to ensure that no one is subjected to torture).
247. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 46, U.N. GOAR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51,
art. 8, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1985) (noting that a state may deny extradition if the
Convention is not following in the requesting state).
248. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (series A) paras. 84-91
(1989) (finding that States contracting to the Convention on Human Rights must
consider what consequences, such as torture, a deportee will face even if the
deportee is a fugitive from justice attempting to abuse the purpose of protections
afforded to refugees).
249. See Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 70 (1991)
(holding that it is the responsibility of an extraditing state to take the responsibility
that a requesting state will not subject a person to torture or to inhumane
treatment).
250. See Chahal v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22414/93, 23 EUR. H.R. REP.
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made clear in relation to Article 3 of the European Convention by the
European Court of Human Rights in Chahal v United Kingdom.2" '
The U.K. Government had sought to deport Chahal, a Sikh militant,
to India on the ground that his presence in the U.K. was contrary to
the public good for reasons of national security and the international
fight against terrorism.2 2 Chahal claimed that if he were to be
deported to India, he would be at serious risk of torture by the Indian
security forces. Before the Court, the U.K. Government argued that
the guarantee in Article 3 against deportation was not absolute in
cases where an individual posed a threat to the national security of
the deporting State. 253 The Court rejected this argument and
reaffirmed the blanket nature of Article 3, stating that, "the activities
of the individual in question, however, undesirable or dangerous,
cannot be a material consideration.""2 4 The rule would appear to
apply as much to suspected war criminals as to suspected
2 55
terrorists.
Given the approach of the minority of the Strasbourg Court in T.
and V., it may be that the manner in which a child soldier is
prosecuted for war crimes or crimes against humanity in the
413, 414 (1996) (stating unequivocally that protection against deportation to a state
where a person may be subjected to torture is absolute).
251. See id. (finding in Article 3 the responsibility of the expelling state to
ensure that the deportee will not be subjected to torture or other inhumane
treatment).
252. See id. (providing that Mr. Chahal was a Sikh separatist leader who had
been refused asylum and in the opinion of the Home Secretary, a threat to national
security).
253. See id. (noting that Mr. Chahal complained that his deportation to India
would expose him to risks of torture).
254. See id. para. 2(b). Stating:
The prohibition provided by Article 3 against ill-treatment is equally absolute
in expulsion cases. Thus, whenever substantial grounds have been shown for
believing that an individual would face a real risk of being subjected to
treatment contrary to Article 3 if removed to another State, the responsibility
of the Contracting State to safeguard him or her against such treatment is
engaged in the event of expulsion. In these circumstances, the activities of the
individual in question however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be a material
consideration.
Id.
255. See Chahal, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 414 (noting that it is more important to
know where a deportee is being sent than why that person was expelled).
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receiving State might of itself amount to inhuman and degrading
treatment. 256 Further, if the result of such a trial might be the
execution of the child soldier, it seems likely that this too would be
contrary to Article 3.7 The execution of persons for crimes
committed whilst under the age of eighteen is fairly generally agreed
8
to be contrary to international law.2
In such circumstances, an exercise of executive discretion granting
the child soldier permission to stay in the State of refuge would seem
appropriate. Such a resolution need not, however, mean that an
individual also gains a grant of immunity.? 9 War crimes and crimes
against humanity are crimes of universal jurisdiction.2' If the alleged
256. See V. v. United Kingdom, 30 EUR. H.R. REP. at 121 (recalling that it was
not considered degrading treatment to convict a ten-year-old of murder in an adult
court).
257. See Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Apr.
28, 1983, 114 Europ. T.S. 32 (inferring that although the Convention abolishes the
death penalty, the European Court of Human Rights has not yet ruled on whether
extradition or deportation from a State party to a State retaining the death penalty
can violate Article 1 of Protocol 6); see also Fidan (1987) 11 Recueil Dalloz-Sirey
305 (Conseil d'Etat) (refusing to extradite M. Fidan to a country still using the
death penalty); Gacem (1988) I Semaine Juridique IV-86 (Conseil d'Etat) (refusing
to extradite M. Gacem to a country using the death penalty); Short v. Netherlands
(1990) 76 Rechtspraak van der Week 358, translation in 29 I.L.M. 221 (1991)
(Supreme Court of the Netherlands) (refusing to extradite Mr. Short, an American
serviceman who murdered his wife while in Holland until the United States agreed
to not charge him with a crime that carried the death penalty).
258. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF TIE DEATII PENALTY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 304-05 (2d ed. 1997). Stating
State practice, with a few lingering exceptions, is consistent with such a
ban... The Human Rights Committee has stated that the prohibition of
execution of children constitutes a customary norm, although it has not
precisely specified the age cut-off. In declaring that the United States'
reservation to article 6, section 5 of the [International] Covenant [on Civil and
Political Rights] was incompatible with the object and purpose of the
instrument, it may have implicitly recognized that execution for crimes
committed under the age of eighteen was contrary to a customary norm.
Id.
259. See BROWNLIE, supra note 139, at 308 (commenting that war crimes are
often considered a breach of international law rather than a violation of the
national law where the crime took place).
260. See id. (noting that a breach of international law, which allows all states to
prosecute, does not necessarily mean that the act is criminal).
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crimes were particularly heinous, there is, of course, no barrier
preventing the State of refuge from prosecuting the child soldier
261
itself.

261. See id. (finding that breaches of the laws of war may be punished by any
state that obtains custody of the offender); see also infra note 139 and
accompanying text.

